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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the 
United States Government (USG) and the American people have 
wondered why we have been unable to effectively influence 
the majority of the population in the Middle East.  Since 
that time, the government has struggled with the question 
of how to both organize for and effectively conduct a 
strategic influence campaign in support of the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT).  Organizing for and conducting an 
effective strategic influence campaign in support of 
national security objectives is a complex enterprise. 
Synergizing the effects of the various tools for strategic 
communications is a pivotal element of any successful 
information campaign.  Also, and no less crucial to success 
is the crafting of appropriate messages and themes relative 
to a particular audience. There are numerous reasons why a 
fissure exists between America and the Middle East: a broad 
cultural divide, political differences, and ideological 
incongruities, among others; nevertheless it would seem 
logical that a nation with the vast resources of the United 
States would be able to bridge the gap.  However, the 
United States’ present capacity to conduct strategic 
influence in the Middle East is hindered by a dysfunctional 
organizational structure relative to strategic information 
operations and an institutional reluctance to recognize or 





Due to the complexity and, to some degree, the 
qualitative nature of the subject matter this paper will 
utilize several different approaches to aid in analyzing 
the organizational structure and inter-relationships of 
U.S. strategic information and influence components.  
First, this thesis will examine the three primary 
components of U.S. strategic influence: public diplomacy, 
public affairs, and psychological operations. Next is a 
look at various U.S. strategic information programs, their 
organizational structure, and the various changes in focus 
and policies from the beginning of the 20th Century to the 
present.  Chapter IV will examine public diplomacy, 
psychological operations, and public affairs as they relate 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Finally, the conclusions and 
recommendations section will attempt to tie it all together 
and make suggestions as to how the mission of strategic 




3II. AMERICA’S STRATEGIC INFLUENCE COMPONENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Public diplomacy, public affairs, and psychological 
operations are essential components of our overall national 
security strategy (NSS). While all three elements play 
complimentary roles they have separate but relatively 
similar missions in the scope of an information campaign: 
to influence and shape perception, opinions and actions.   
Since 9-11, the USG has had to almost entirely re-
invent its strategic influence methodology and 
organizational structure to meet new information 
requirements.  The complexity and ever-increasing scope of 
the information environment has created a dilemma for the 
United States Government (USG) in that the traditional 
methodology and application of strategic influence, as we 
know it from the Cold War, may not provide a practical 
means to significantly deter or influence. The 
proliferation of news sources, both satellite and internet-
based has made it increasingly difficult to influence 
opinions and attitudes on a global scale.   
The requirement for a symbiotic relationship between 
foreign policy and strategic influence has always existed.  
Coordinating the two requires a delicate balance of truth, 
half-truths, and propaganda.  The effective implementation 
of strategic influence programs can, and should, be an 
enabling factor for achieving foreign policy objectives 
across a broad spectrum. 
 
 
4B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
‘Information Operations’ is a relatively new term that 
describes the sum of various emerging technologies and 
information manipulation methods used in the conduct of, 
what was once known as ‘information warfare’. The Joint 
Doctrine for Information Operations defines information 
operations (IO) as “actions taken to affect adversary 
decision-making processes, information, and information 
systems while defending our own”1.  Information, as raw, 
unprocessed data, is an elementary ingredient of command, 
combat, communications, computer, intelligence, and 
information systems (C4I).  When that data is converted 
into knowledge and perception, it becomes an important part 
of the commander’s decision-making process.  Information 
from sources such as the media influences perceptions and 
attitudes, and serves to shape ideologies.  IO is a tool 
that seeks to influence that decision-making process. In 
its various forms, IO applies to the full range of military 
operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.  Although 
the term ‘information operations’ has a technological 
connotation it also includes the employment of non-
technical means, such as the exploitation of social and 
cultural factors or the use of less technical means of 
communication to convey information, to facilitate civil-
military operations (CMO), psychological operations, or 
tactical deception.   
Information operations, by DoD definition2, consist of: 
• Military Deception (MilDec) 
• Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 
                     
1 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Joint Publication 3-13. Chapter 
II. 9 October 1998. 4-7. 
2 Ibid.
 
5• Computer Network Operations (which includes 
Computer Network Exploitation, Attack, and 
Defense) 
• Operational Security (OPSEC) 
• Electronic Warfare (EW) 
 
There are other components that loosely fall under the 
umbrella of Information Operations but are not considered  
‘core elements’ or pillars of IO, those include:  Public 
Affairs, Civil Affairs, Physical Destruction, and Public 
Diplomacy.3 
There is a distinct difference between the elements of 
IO as defined by the DoD and what actually constitutes that 
which enables strategic influence.  Noted author, Joseph 
Nye Jr., coined the term “soft power”, which he describes 
as the “ability to get what you want by attracting and 
persuading others to adopt your goals.”4  Soft power is 
wielded or exercised in the form of strategic 
communications involving public diplomacy, public affairs, 
and psychological operations.  Its scope is more strategic 
in nature in that its application is aimed at achieving 
political ends by exposing foreign audiences to American 
culture, democratic ideals, and market economies. 
 
C. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Public diplomacy as a tool for influencing foreign 
governments and populations has renewed importance for the 
USG given that it is now intimately involved in the GWOT. 
                     
3 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Joint Publication 3-13. Chapter 
II. 9 October 1998. 4-7. 
4 Joseph S. Nye Jr.  “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”. The 
International Herald Tribune.  10 Jan 2003.
  
6According to the State Department, public diplomacy is an 
effort focused on advocating American policy and ideals to 
foreign audiences around the globe. The now-defunct U.S. 
Information Agency defined public diplomacy as “promoting 
the national interest and the national security of the 
United States through understanding, informing, and 
influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.”5  According to Hans Tuch, author of Communicating 
with the World, public diplomacy is an “official government 
effort to shape the communications environment overseas in 
which American foreign policy is played out in order to 
reduce the degree to which misperceptions and 
misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and 
other nations.”6  Another definition of public diplomacy 
comes from Joseph Duffey, director of the USIA from 1993-
1999, who stated:  
Public diplomacy is the studied attempt to 
understand foreign cultures and institutions so 
as to enhance the communication and advocacy of 
the national goals and interests of the United 
States.  It is the active engagement in such 
communication, based upon study and analysis and 
thought.  It involves exchanges, programmed 
visits, speakers, conferences, intellectual 
encounters, broadcasting and, most of all, 
strategic planning.7   
Those elements engaged in the conduct of public 
diplomacy and concerned with its strategic depth must be 
cognizant of the targeted population or actors and the 
                     
5 “What is Public Diplomacy?”. Internet.  Available from 
http://www.public diplomacy.org/1.htm Accessed 5 April 2004. 
6 
 
Tuch, Hans. Communicating with the World. St. Martin's Press, NY, 
1990. 3. 
7 United States Information Agency, Public Diplomacy Forum, 
September 1998.  Internet.  Available from http://www.usia.gov. 
Accessed 13 December 2004. 
7environment in which they exist.  Important elements that 
must be understood include, but are not limited to: 
• Religion 
• Regional politics 
• Social structure  
• Literacy rates and language 
• Relationships between the government and its 
citizens 
• Economic structure and viability 
• Regional media influences 
• Technology 
• Education levels  
Public diplomacy differs from conventional diplomacy, 
which seeks collaboration between governments, in that it 
attempts to cultivate universal perceptions and support 
between a nation and citizens of other countries by 
identifying its own institutions and activities with those 
citizens’ interests.  Public diplomacy uses various means 
of communication mediums to foster a shared understanding 
of American ideals and principles. A common or shared 
understanding, theoretically, promotes a greater sense of 
unity amongst various cultures and facilitates the 
accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. The USG 
attempts to exercise public diplomacy through the 
distribution of literary materials, sponsoring academic 
scholarships and exchanges programs, exhibiting American 
art and culture, broadcasting about U.S. values and 
policies in various languages, and transmitting news to 
8oppressed peoples who lack information sources other than 
those generated by a despotic government.8   
From all appearances, public diplomacy seems like a 
rather benign informational component similar to public 
affairs. However, the significant difference is that public 
affairs is used to inform domestic audiences while the 
premise behind public diplomacy is to influence 
internationally, either in a subtle manner or through overt 
means.  That doesn’t mean to say that public affairs, by 
itself, is not an influencing factor on intended audiences, 
however, its stated purpose is separate from public 
diplomacy.  
 
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
Psychological operations or psychological warfare 
employs specific techniques to influence audiences outside 
of the United States.  PSYOPS are a component of 
information operations (IO) that conveys selected 
information to a foreign audience for the purpose of 
influencing behavior in support of military/political 
objectives.  Because PSYOP messages are not intended to be 
either objective or comprehensive, its mission and 
organizational structure have been kept separate from 
public affairs and public diplomacy.   When utilized 
correctly, PSYOPS can reduce the efficiency of the enemy’s 
military forces, influence enemy commanders and political 
decision-makers, lower enemy moral and create confusion 
within their ranks.  The Joint Publication for Joint 
                     
8 United States Information Agency, Public Diplomacy Forum, September 1998.  
Internet.  Available from http://www.usia.gov. Accessed 13 December 2004.
 
9Psychological Operations, JP 3-53, describes three 




At the strategic level, PSYOP may include political or 
diplomatic positions, announcements, or official 
communications for the consumption of targeted decision-
makers or those who influence the decision-making process. 
It could either be political leaders themselves or foreign 
populations. President Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) in the 1980’s is a good example of how 
strategic psychological operations, in concert with a well-
planned and executed deception plan, can provide long-term, 
strategically-focused manipulation of another political 
entity; in this case the Soviet Union.  By ‘selling’ the 
idea that the U.S. had developed a missile defense system 
that could defend American soil against intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) strikes, the Soviet Union, for all 
intent and purpose, bankrupted itself trying to counter the 
program thus ending the Cold War. 
At the operational level, psychological operations 
includes the circulation of leaflets, loudspeaker 
broadcasts, radio and television broadcasts, and other 
means of transmitting information that may encourage enemy 
forces to defect, desert, or surrender. Continual attacks 
can magnify PSYOPS effects, accelerating the lowering of 
morale and further encouraging the breakdown of enemy 
forces.  PSYOP messages, by themselves or in concert with 
                     
9
 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. Joint Publication 3-53. 5 
September 2003 
10
military deception (MilDec), are crafted such that they 
directly or indirectly influence military operations within 
a specific area of responsibility (AOR).  Operational-level 
PSYOP was conducted against the Iraqis in OIF in the form 
of e-mail and text messaging to regime military leaders 
that, in turn, translated into some sort of action by those 
units that rendered them relatively ineffective against 
Coalition forces during the initial attack to Baghdad.  
At the tactical level, PSYOPS are conducted through 
the use of loudspeakers, printed handbills, as well as 
other means of conveying information to populations in a 
crisis region such as meetings between military commanders 
and civic or religious leaders.  Although many of the 
tactical and operational PSYOP dissemination means are 
similar, their scope is different.  In layman’s terms, the 
three levels of PSYOPS can be thought of as increasing 
concentric circles (tactical to strategic). All three of 
these types of psychological operations are utilized to 
establish and reinforce perceptions of the United States’ 
military and political resolve.10 
 
E. PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
The Department of Defense (DoD) possesses a very 
healthy information capability used to inform (and 
influence) foreign audiences during both peacetime and war.  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 
(ASD/PA) is responsible for managing public affairs 
activities.  The primary means of communicating with 
foreign audiences are through public affairs messages.  
Their messages should be conducted in concert with PSYOP 
                     
10 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. Joint Publication 3-53. 5 
September 2003 I-4.  
11
programs.  The Department of Defense’s public affairs 
programs are generally coordinated in accordance with the 
interagency process and are intended to support the 
Department of State’s public diplomacy efforts.11 
Public affairs in support of national strategic 
initiatives include news releases, public announcements, 
press briefings, official visits, defense-related web site 
production and maintenance, community relations, and 
regional command information programs.  The primary purpose 
of public affairs within DoD is to provide current and 
accurate information to military commanders, their staffs, 
active duty and reserve military personnel, their families, 
as well as other audiences that include members of the U.S. 
Congress, their staff and the private media structure.12   
The global media coverage that is provided by 
satellite communications makes the planning for public 
affairs more important than ever before.  The reporting of 
news influences public opinion, which, in turn, affects the 
legitimacy of an operation or campaign and ultimately may 
determine its success or failure. Managing perceptions 
through a coordinated and comprehensive public affairs 
campaign is crucial to influencing overall public 
perception of political objectives or military operations.  
The development of an information campaign plan that can 
capitalize on both the ability of the media to influence 
domestic audiences and psychological operations to 
favorably influence public opinion and perceptions abroad 
is essential.  However, and by directive, public affairs 
                     
11 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. Joint Publication 3-53. 5 




Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. Joint Publication 3-61.  
14 May 1997. vi. 
12
may not be used as a form of military deception or as an 
element of a disinformation campaign against either 
domestic or foreign audiences, nor can “propaganda or 
publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion…be 
included in [Department of Defense] public affairs 
programs.”13 Public affairs may not “focus on directing or 
manipulating public actions or opinion” and by directive 
“must be separate and distinct”14 from psychological 
operations. 
Public affairs contrasts with public diplomacy in that 
its aim is to encourage public awareness on the domestic 
front and gain support for government policies, activities, 
and institutions as well as to give an accounting of 
government management of public assets.  The Department of 
Defense (DoD) claims to conduct public diplomacy through 
combined training exercises with foreign military’s, 
official visits, officer exchange programs, and military 
contacts with foreign officials.15 However, these 
definitions, as provided by the DoD, contradict the reality 
of public affairs.  Information intended for domestic 
consumption has ramifications far beyond the border of the 
United States.    
 
                     










III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Strategic influence is certainly not a new phenomenon 
and has been a significant factor in the successes (or 
failures) of empires throughout the ages.  The United 
States has engaged in strategic influence campaigns in some 
form or fashion since its foundation; however it wasn’t 
until the early 20th Century that America became a viable 
world power with the necessity to influence on a global 
scale.   
In the first noteworthy ‘American’ global influence 
effort of the 20th Century, President Teddy Roosevelt’s “Big 
Stick” diplomacy was embodied in the Great White Fleet16 
that sailed around the world from December 1907 to February 
1909.  The aggregate of the U.S. Naval warships that 
participated were given the name, the ‘Great White Fleet’, 
due to their bright white-painted hulls.  The ships made 
port calls throughout the world with the purpose of 
impressing foreign leaders and reinforcing the impression 
that America had become a world naval power capable of 
projecting influence around the globe.   During Roosevelt’s 
presidency, public diplomacy or foreign affairs was a less 
complicated endeavor.  Authority and decision-making were a 
much more centralized process due to a less cumbersome 
bureaucratic structure.  The executive branch of 
government, unlike today, had a significantly greater 
amount of power in relation to its ability to make and 
                     
16 The Great White Fleet ordered to sail around the world by President 
Theodore Roosevelt from 16 December 1907 to 22 February 1909 consisted of 
sixteen new battleships of the Atlantic Fleet.  The battleships were painted 
white except for gilded scrollwork on their bows. 
14
execute policy, particularly in the realm of foreign 
affairs.  This was partly a function of a simpler, less 
informed populace and a world where information flowed 
slowly to consumers due to technological limitations.  
Also, in terms of public diplomacy and foreign policy, the 
world geopolitical landscape was less complex than it is 
the 21st Century. 
Unfortunately, throughout the last one hundred or so 
years, the U.S. has consistently struggled with the 
question of how to effectively organize for and conduct 
strategic influence or strategic psychological warfare.  
Between World War I until the present, there have been, 
literally, dozens of different organizations formed to 
study, conduct, or provide oversight for strategic 
influence and/or government sponsored-information programs.    
Definitions of what actually constitutes our strategic 
influence capabilities have changed numerous times, 
organizations dedicated to conducting strategic influence 
have been created and then disbanded, and an integrated 
information and influence strategy has eluded the USG 
throughout the past one hundred years. In order to 
understand how we should organize for and conduct strategic 
influence programs in the present it is first necessary to 
take a look at how that mission has been accomplished in 





B. WORLD WAR I 
In 1917, following America’s entry in to the ‘Great 
War’17, then President Woodrow Wilson instituted the 
Committee of Public Information (CPI) for the purpose of 
swaying public opinion in support of the war against 
Germany.  The CPI, also known as the Creel Committee (named 
after its fiery chairman, George Creel), utilized every 
available method to shape public opinion and garner support 
for the U.S. entry into the war.  Creel, with a reputation 
as a controversial muckraker, reached out to the 
entertainment and advertising industries to help with the 
development of a number of sophisticated propaganda 
techniques.  In his 1920 memoirs entitled How We Advertised 
America, Creel declared the following: 
…[the] war was not fought in France alone…it was 
the fight for the minds of men, for the ‘conquest 
of convictions’, and the battle-line ran through 
every home in every country…It was in this 
recognition of Public Opinion as a major force 
that the Great War differed most essentially from 
all previous conflicts.  The trial of strength 
was not only between massed bodies of armed men, 
but between opposing ideals, and moral verdicts 
took on all the value of military decisions. …In 
all things, from first to last, without half or 
change, it was a plain publicity proposition, a 
vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world’s 
greatest adventure in advertising…”18 
Creel’s most famous endeavor in the realm of 
propaganda was the concept of the “Four-Minute Men”. The 
program consisted of a number of speakers, trained by the 
CPI, who would go into movie houses or other public 
                     
17 
 
The term “Great War” refers to World War I (1915-1918). 
18 
 
Creel, George.  “How We Advertised America”. (New York:  Harper & 
Brothers, 1920) 3-9.  Internet.  http://www.historytools.org/ sources/ 
creel.html.  Accessed 28 September 2004. 
16
gathering places to espouse concepts such as the purchase 
of Liberty Bonds, donations to the Red Cross, or enlistment 
in the Armed Forces.  The speeches themselves were 
relatively short; approximately four minutes in length, 
hence the name.  According to CPI’s records, roughly 75,000 
‘Four-Minute Men’ (and women) made a total of 7,555,190 
speeches between 1917 and 1918.19  
  
C. WORLD WAR II 
The Second World War provided the first valid 
examination of U.S.’s ability to manipulate the information 
environment.  At the beginning of the war, the USG and the 
War Department lacked the necessary organizational 
structure for conducting an integrated influence campaign 
of any substance.   In the mid-1930’s, strategic influence 
and information warfare began to garner attention within 
the USG due to the rise of the Nazi party in Germany.  
Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party had devoted much of their 
time and effort to the development of comprehensive 
propaganda programs designed to increase feelings of 
nationalism in the German population as well as manipulate 
and strike fear in their European neighbors.  The Nazi’s 
viewed strategic influence as a weapon in and of itself and 
leveraged this capability to the fullest extent in 
preparation for it’s upcoming attacks on Eastern and 
Western Europe. 
During World War II, the U.S. used propaganda—a 
creative mix of public affairs, public relations, and 
psychological operations--as one of, if not the most 
                     
19 “Committee on Public Information”. Internet. Available from 





important, factor in the transformation from political 
neutrality to active involvement in the war.  Arguably, 
U.S. propaganda efforts controlled the path that the war 
took.  Posters igniting powerful anti-Japanese and German 
feelings, pushing for the purchase of war bonds and 
enlistment in the armed forces, and psychological 
operations aimed at enemy troops, U.S. propaganda was 
pivotal in instilling patriotic fervor on the home front 
and spurred other nations to active participation in the 
war effort.  
To organize for the conduct of strategic information 
programs, President Roosevelt formed two new organizations, 
the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS).  OWI had two significant roles.  
First, it had a mandate to utilize all informational means 
available to inspire patriotic fervor in the American 
public and attract people to support the war effort.  A 
public affairs/propaganda campaign was initiated on an 
unprecedented scale that would bring to bear the real 
source of American might: the public.  Secondly, the OWI 
would organize and implement strategic psychological 
operations or propaganda campaigns to support the overseas 
influence effort.  OSS was responsible for the conduct of 
special operations missions—namely sabotage, limited scale 
raids, and other special missions in support of theater 
objectives.20 
The premise behind the creation of OWI was to 
consolidate war information and psychological operations 
                     
20 Paddock, Alfred J., “Military Psychological Operations”, in Political 
Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach, ed. Frank B. 
Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
1989), 46. 
18
under one unified agency thereby streamlining the decision-
making process under one controlling entity.  However, the 
discernible increase in wartime propaganda had formed the 
need to separate the psychological warfare and propaganda 
function from the planning and conduct of special 
operations missions and intelligence operations.  Overlap 
between the two efforts had created squabbling among the 
principles involved leading to ineffective and duplicative 
efforts minus appropriate coordination and de-confliction. 
Subsequent executive directives refined the mission of each 
agency and illuminated each agency’s area of responsibility 
in an effort to reduce inhibiting factors effecting 
functionality.21 
Recognizing a capabilities shortfall within the realm 
of strategic communications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) created the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and 
the Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Subcommittee.  
Meanwhile, OSS created the Supporting Committee on 
Psychological Warfare and the director, Colonel Donovan, 
headed another committee: the Joint Psychological Warfare 
Advisory Committee.  The purpose of this organization was 
to coordinate all information activities with other 
government and civilian agencies that operated 
independently of the War Department; these included the 
Department of State (DoS) and the Office of War 
Information.22 
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While the intent was to streamline the process of 
message construction and dissemination along with improving 
bureaucratic process and organization, the number of 
organizations actively involved in the planning and conduct 
of influence and psychological operations had multiplied 
exponentially since the onset of World War II.  The 
increase vice decrease or simplification of organizational 
structure became more of an impediment to progress than a 
facilitator of productive efforts.   
At the end of 1942, despite the fact that America was 
firmly entrenched in a two-front global conflict, the War 
Department recognized the need to cut out some of the 
unneeded elements of the entire psychological and strategic 
influence bureaucracy.  They chose to eliminate the 
Psychological Warfare Branch due to interagency squabbles 
regarding each office’s mission and scope.  Subsequently, 
the JCS also chose to eliminate its own standing committees 
dealing with PSYOPS and turned over responsibilities to the 
OSS, which was better organized and equipped to carry out 
the task of strategic communications.23 
Despite the dissolution of the various offices located 
in and around Washington DC, the military services still 
maintained an organic PSYOPS capability but these were 
limited to the operational and tactical levels of war.  The 
JCS, in the same document which provided the guidance to 
disband the various psychological warfare offices, gave 
each theater commander, Pacific and European, the ability 
to control, coordinate, and implement psychological warfare 
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in their respective areas of operations (AO). The JCS 
document implied that theater commanders would be allowed 
to determine their own relationship with OWI and OSS, as 
needed.  Subsequently, each theater commander created his 
own Psychological Warfare Branch that would then have the 
latitude to conduct PSYOPS or influence operations at the 
operational and/or tactical level in support of theater 
objectives.24   
The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight 
Eisenhower, created the largest Psychological Warfare 
Branch at his headquarters in North Africa in November of 
1942--the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ).  In 
early 1944, PWB/AFHQ had been reconstituted as the 
Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Allied Headquarters 
Europe (PWD/SHAEF).  PWD/SHAEF defined psychological 
warfare as “the dissemination of propaganda designed to 
undermine the enemy’s will to resist, demoralize his forces 
and sustain the morale of our supporters.”25 PWD’s mission 
statements, as stated by General Eisenhower, were: 
1. To wage psychological warfare against the enemy 
2. To use the various media available to 
psychological warfare to sustain the morale of 
the people of friendly nations occupied by the 
enemy and to cause the people of these countries 
to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme 
Commander. 
3. To control information services in Allied-
occupied Germany. 
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4. To conduct consolidation propaganda operations in 
liberated friendly countries.26 
For the allies, psychological warfare’s impact on the 
war effort and how it contributed to the defeat of Germany 
were hard to accurately assess. However, General Eisenhower 
felt that PSYOP had played such a momentous role in the 
defeat of Germany that it was vital to maintain a PSYOP 
capability and conduct further study of it’s utility in 
future conflict.  Eisenhower noted in his after-action 
report of the war: 
The exact contribution of psychological warfare 
toward the final victory cannot, of course, be 
measured in terms of towns destroyed or barriers 
passed.  However, I am convinced that the 
expenditure of men and money in wielding the 
spoken and written word was an important 
contributing factor in undermining the enemy’s 
will to resist and supporting the fighting morale 
of our potential Allies in the occupied 
countries.  Without doubt, psychological warfare 
has proved its right to a place of dignity in our 
military arsenal.27 
The global struggle waged during World War II provided 
the thrust for the development of strategic influence as an 
integrating enabler of U.S. foreign policy and provided, in 
essence, the foundation for modern propaganda and 
psychological warfare that would play an even larger role 
in U.S. foreign affairs during the Cold War. 
 
D. THE COLD WAR 
The requirements for conducting strategic influence 
and psychological warfare increased dramatically during the 
early years of the Cold War—a war of conflicting ideologies 
                     





between the United States and the Soviet Union.  In the 
late 1940’s and early 50’s it had become apparent in the 
West that the Soviet Union was developing into a formidable 
opponent both as a military power and in terms of their 
ability to leverage propaganda as a key instrument of 
foreign policy. The Soviet propaganda machine was 
reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s pre-World War II influence 
apparatus.  Government officials recognized that if the 
U.S. was going to be able contain Soviet expansionism it 
had to step up its own strategic information programs.  At 
the dawn of the nuclear age, and with each side looking for 
a strategic edge, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union recognized that propaganda, control of information, 
and strategic influence could provide the edge that both 
sought so ardently.  The early years of the Cold War saw 
the USG’s establishing three critical pieces of legislation 
which would provide the framework for American influence 
and strategic information programs for the next three 
decades: the National Security Act of 1947, the Smith-Mundt 
Act, and the NSC-68. 
 
1. National Security Act Of 1947  
As the first “Cold War” President, Harry Truman signed 
the National Security Act that provided for the 
establishment of integrating policies and procedures for 
all departments, agencies, and functions of the federal 
government relating to national security.  The origins of 
the National Security Act date back to the period 
immediately following World War II.28  In 1945, the 
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Secretary of the Navy commissioned a group of national 
security experts to study how the post-war national 
security apparatus should be organized. The study concluded 
that the military and supporting executive agencies were 
not integrated effectively and lacked a unity of effort.29 
Aside from the military reorganization30, the National 
Security Act also transformed the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
who would be responsible for the conduct of intelligence 
gathering and clandestine operations in support of national 
security objectives.  Those operations would include using 
subversive psychological and influence operations to 
undermine Soviet and Soviet-bloc political, military, and 
economic viability.31  
In response to the mission of utilizing information as 
an instrument of strategic influence, the CIA covertly 
established and funded overseas broadcasting stations.  
These CIA-sponsored radio programs, designed to creatively 
illuminate U.S. government policies, were broadcast to 
people within Soviet-bloc countries in an attempt to 
destabilize the spread of Communism at the grassroots 
level.32 
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2. Smith-Mundt Act 
Following an official visit to Europe in which they 
witness first hand the enormity of the Soviet propaganda 
machine, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Representative Karl 
Mundt sponsored the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) to counter 
hostile Soviet propaganda. The Smith-Mundt Act formed the 
fundamental charter for U.S. public diplomacy and strategic 
influence following World War II and established the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA).33 Smith-Mundt allotted the 
necessary funding for U.S. foreign information programs and 
provided: 
for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of 
information about the United States, its people, 
and its policies, through press, publications, 
radio, motion pictures, and other information 
media, and through information centers and 
instructors abroad.34  
The Smith-Mundt Act, which had very little opposition 
in Congress, “breathed life into overseas information 
programs”, and laid the groundwork for the creation of the 
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a significant organization 
relative to strategic influence programs and one which will 
be discussed in detail later on in this thesis.35 
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3. NSC 68 
In 1949, Cold War tensions took on a significant new 
dynamic.  The Soviet Union had detonated their first atomic 
bomb at a remote test site in Kazakhstan on 29 August.36  
Members of President Truman’s administration argued that 
America needed to increase its strategic influence efforts 
to counter the Soviets emergence as an atomic power.37  In 
1950, following the North Korean attack on South Korea, 
Truman signed NSC 68 which directed the increase of both 
overt and covert political, psychological, and economic 
warfare with the sole purpose of creating political and 
social unrest within Soviet-bloc countries—this was 
directly in accordance with George Kennan’s strategy to 
“contain” the Soviet Union within its own geographic 
borders utilizing economic aid packages and strategic 
information programs to foster pro-American or anti-Soviet 
inclinations among various “buffer” states.38   
 
E. THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY 
In the early to mid-1950s, there were three different 
organizations intimately involved with strategic 
information policies and programs:  Department of Defense, 
CIA, and the State Department.  To ensure continuity of 
policies and programs, each organization established 
liaison elements for the purpose of synchronizing strategic 
influence efforts with the other departments.  
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The election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 to the 
Presidency brought about a new focus on PSYOPS and 
strategic information programs in general.  Eisenhower’s 
experiences during World War II had validated his beliefs 
that the geopolitical landscape could be shaped to our 
advantage  with  a  comprehensive information strategy.  To  
illustrate that point, in a NSC directive, Eisenhower noted 
“psychological operations are established instruments of 
our national power.”39  
Shortly after taking office, Eisenhower established 
the President’s Committee on International Information 
Activities (PCIIA) whose purpose was to study the U.S. 
information strategy for the Cold War and make 
recommendations as to how it could or should be improved.  
PCIIA concluded that U.S. information programs were 
inadequate and that the overall strategy under Truman was 
too reactive to the Soviets propaganda programs and lacked 
any inherent offensive posture.  The study also concluded 
that the PSB had never fully integrated its existing 
psychological warfare strategy with national security 
objectives.40   
Shortly after the PCIIA’s report was published, 
Eisenhower replaced the Psychological Strategy Board with 
the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), whose mission was 
to “coordinate and integrate psychological with national 
strategy and, more importantly, to act as the coordinating 
and integrating arm of the National Security Council for 
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all aspects of the implementation of national security 
policy.”41  More significantly, the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) was officially established as an 
independent agency for the purpose of providing a foreign 
information dissemination programs.42  USIA was responsible 
for the coordination of policies, plans, and operations for 
the foreign information program.  Additionally, USIA also 
provided guidance to other departments concerning the 
official treatment of news originating from foreign 
information outlets. USIA’s purview, however, was confined 
only to areas where military operations were not being 
conducted.43   
Following Eisenhower’s presidency, the U.S. strategic 
influence efforts and capabilities began to fragment.  The 
Department of Defense and JCS disbanded their psychological 
warfare offices.  During the twenty or so years from the 
Kennedy administration, in the early 1960’s, until the time 
that Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the U.S. utilized 
strategic information programs as a component of national 
security strategy, however it was not a priority.   
U.S. strategic information programs during the Cold 
War were more reactive to Soviet propaganda campaigns vice 
proactive and foreign policy suffered as a result.  The CIA 
still conducted covert operations and influence campaigns 
and the USIA maintained control of overt foreign 
information programs. In the 1960’s, USIA’s information 
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program strategy shifted from persuasion and an advisory 
role to more of an informative function with a focus on 
objective reporting of news events.  Each subsequent 
administration until 1980 failed to create a permanent 
organization dedicated to the conduct of strategic 
information operations.  Various departments were still 
expected to coordinate their activities with other agencies 
but there was still no controlling entity.44 USIA remained 
the lead agency regarding strategic information programs 
but, again, the emphasis shifted away from strategic 




The war in Vietnam was destructive to the level of 
American confidence enjoyed in the early 1950’s and 60’s.  
The war along with the Watergate scandal had shattered 
American confidence in both the institution of the 
Presidency and also affected U.S. credibility among foreign 
audiences.  The fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the Iranian 
hostage crisis in 1979, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1980, the growth of international terrorism, and the 
hastening of the nuclear arms race raised questions about 
the United States’ capacity to have influence over 
international affairs.46 
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The USG’s lack of focus on strategic influence during 
this period and its tactical and operational-level focus on 
Vietnam led to a reduction in effectiveness against the 
Soviet’s strategic propaganda effort.  It appeared that the 
tide of history was turning in favor of the Communists.  
While the United States was mired in recession and the 
Vietnam conflict, pro-Soviet governments were making 
inroads abroad, particularly in the Third World.47  The 
United States had, for all intent and purpose, lost the 
Vietnam War allowing the peninsula to become a unified, 
sovereign country under Communist rule.  Meanwhile, several 
other Communist governments and pro-Soviet insurgencies 
were popping up throughout Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
Latin America as well.   
In reaction to the appearance that the U.S. was 
‘losing’ the Cold War in the late 1970’s, many academics, 
politicians, journalists, and policy makers rebelled 
against then President Jimmy Carter’s liberal policies on 
defense and the ‘containment’ of Communism.   Many of these 
experts, both Democrat and Republican, chose to align 
themselves with Ronald Reagan, who pledged openly to tackle 
Soviet expansionism head on.48 
 
G. THE REAGAN ERA 
Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 with a mandate to 
return America to a position of dominance on a global 
scale.  The Reagan administration was committed to stemming 
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the spread of Communism, particularly in the Third World.  
Reagan, however, would not allow the U.S. to be pulled into 
any protracted, long-term interventions as had happened in 
Vietnam.  Instead, he preferred quick campaigns to attack 
or overthrow leftist governments utilizing both military 
and informational means.  Under Reagan, strategic influence 
was elevated from a supporting or subordinate role in U.S. 
national security strategy to a main area of focus along 
with traditional diplomacy, military, and economic 
strength.49  The foundation for Reagan’s global influence 
strategy was laid out in three directives:  National 
Security Decision Directives (NSDD) 45, 77, and 130.   
NSDD 45 focused on U.S. international broadcasting 
programs and declared it a fundamental component of U.S. 
national security policy.50  It also provided the necessary 
funding and political mandate to increase U.S. propaganda 
programs abroad through international broadcasting programs 
like Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and Radio 
Liberty.51 NSDD 45 also established Radio Marti’ for the 
purpose of rallying anti-Castro support in Cuba and among 
Cuban exiles in and around south Florida.52  
NSDD 77 established a Special Planning Group (SPG), 
under the control of the NSC, to conduct planning and 
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coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts.53  The 
President’s National Security Advisor chaired the SPG, 
whose other members included the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of State, and the director of the USIA among 
others.  NSDD 77 also established four other committees 
that reported to the SPG:  the Public Affairs Committee, 
the International Information Committee, the International 
Broadcasting Committee and the International Political 
Committee.54 
Another critical aspect of NSDD 77 was that it gave 
the Public Affairs Committee responsibility for planning 
and coordinating significant speeches relating to national 
security.  It also provided guidance for the planning, 
coordination, and implementation of public affairs for 
foreign policy events as well as other issues relating to 
national security.55  
The International Information Committee was 
responsible for the planning, coordination and 
implementation of international information activities in 
support of national security policies and objectives.  This 
organization’s activities were almost all USIA-related and 
managed by the Director of USIA.56 
The International Political Committee was controlled 
by the State Department and had responsibility for the 
development, synchronization, and execution of 
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international political activities relating to national 
security matters.  NSDD 77 also directed the International 
Political Committee to counter Soviet information programs.  
Additionally, the directive gave the Department of State 
the responsibility of providing direction to other agencies  
regarding the implementation of political action strategies 
in support of the International Political Committee’s 
established objectives.57 
Towards the end of Reagan’s first term as President, 
the administration felt that it was necessary to refocus 
U.S. strategic influence policies and objectives above and 
beyond what NSDD 45 and 77 had provided the previous four 
years.  A defining moment in U.S. strategic influence 
operations occurred in March of 1984 when the President 
signed NSDD 130. This document reiterated the 
administration’s commitment to strategic information.  
NSDD 130 envisioned information as “a strategic 
instrument for shaping fundamental political and 
ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis 
and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments…” and 
declared information as a key strategic instrument to 
affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to U.S. national 
interests.  
NSDD 130 also stated that it was “vital that the Armed 
Forces maintain a strong and active international 
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information capability.”58  In addition, the directive also 
noted that,  in  order  to be effective, the U.S. national 
security apparatus should contain people with 
“sophisticated training in the international information 
environment…”59   
Reagan-era strategic influence, both in terms of it’s 
organization and focus, was so successful that it directly 
contributed to the end of the Cold War, the democratization 
of several Third World nations, and the rebirth of U.S. 
nationalism.  The Reagan administration’s efforts were also 
instrumental in facilitating his successor’s, George Bush, 
ability to construct and maintain a multi-national 
coalition during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 
1990-91.  
 
H. A NEW WORLD ORDER 
President George Bush inherited an entirely different 
geopolitical situation than any of the previous eight 
Presidents. The Cold War had ended, global 
telecommunication technology was exploding, and America had 
no monolithic adversary to prepare for war against.  Bush, 
having served as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
in the 1970’s, understood the importance of information 
programs, covert and overt, domestic and foreign, in 
furthering national objectives.  Due to the vastly 
different international landscape, President Bush felt it 
necessary to re-evaluate international information 
programs, along with their organizational structure and 
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mission.  Political pressure over budget concerns, existing 
from a huge national debt left over from the Reagan years, 
prodded the Bush Administration to study how strategic 
influence components could be consolidated in order to 
increase efficiency and reduce costs.   
National Security Directive (NSD) 51, which superseded 
Reagan’s NSDD 77, provided the impetus to create the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).60  However, due to 
budget constraints in the Clinton-era presidency, it wasn’t 
until October 1st, 1999, as part of the 1998 Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act, that the BBG became an 
independent organization responsible for all government and 
government-sponsored international broadcasting programs.61 
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an 
independent, autonomous organization responsible for all 
USG and government-sponsored, non-military, international 
broadcasting programs.  It was created on 1 October 1999 as 
a result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act under the Clinton Administration.  The 
BBG is actually made up of several different broadcasters:  
the Voice of America (VOA), Alhurra, Radio Sawa, Radio 
Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free 
Asia (RFA), and Radio and TV Marti.  The BBG receives 
assistance from the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) 
in all matters pertaining to international broadcasting.  
Each week, more than 100 million listeners tune in to BBG 
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managed, U.S. sponsored radio and TV programs broadcasted 
in 65 languages.   The focus of these radio and TV 
stations is on broadcasting content that supports democracy 
as well as providing information which is related to the 
establishment of democratic institutions.62 
In support of U.S. foreign policy following September 
11th, the BBG has established three priorities: 
• To provide accurate and objective news and 
information to priority areas in support of the 
war against terrorism; 
 
• To provide clear and accurate information to 
regions of the world where freedom of information 
is suppressed or denied, or to areas that lack 
freedom and democracy; 
 
• To serve humanitarian efforts by assisting 
nations in crisis, or are suffering epidemics and 
illiteracy.63 
Despite the fact that the BBG has played a pivotal 
role in the dissemination of U.S.-sponsored messages in 
states and regions that lack the free flow of information, 
there are still plenty of questions regarding its role as a 
legitimate component of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
I. PRESENT GEOPOLITICS AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS 
A significant trend in geopolitics is the development 
of exclusive alliances based upon common economic or 
political goals that have been facilitated by the 
information and technology explosion of the early 1990’s. 
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The dispersal of culture, ideas, and trade on a global 
scale will continue to have a symbiotic effect on the 
world’s populations.  New communication and information 
technologies provide instant connectivity worldwide in all 
matters pertaining to political, social, and economic 
integration.  It stands to reason that the growth of global 
communications will continue to accelerate and increase the 
collective awareness of events and issues worldwide making 
information readily accessible to even the remotest areas 
of the earth. For the United States, the technological 
revolution has become a double-edged sword.  As U.S. 
information capabilities grow, so do those of the rest of 
the world through the exportation of new technologies.  No 
longer does America possess an information monopoly, 
contrary to the belief of most U.S. citizens.  Anecdotal 
proof of this point lies in the fact that the majority of 
the Arab world still is unclear as to what actually 
transpired on September 11th or why the U.S. chose to 
conduct offensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
effect “regime change”.  Foreign news agencies such as 
Qatar-based Al-Jazeera have effectively countered U.S. 
information programs designed at illuminating and, perhaps 
justifying, American foreign policy and intent relative to 
the war in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism.   
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IV. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 uncovered 
several significant weaknesses in U.S. information policies 
and strategy.  For fifty years, America had focused on 
countering the Soviet military and ideological threats.  
However, after the end of the Cold War, the USG failed to 
reorganize and adjust its strategy for two specific 
emerging threats—asymmetric and/or non-state actors.  The 
U.S. has always trained and organized to win the last war 
and our strategic information programs and strategy were no 
different.  The fact that the USG could never adequately 
integrate strategic influence capabilities under one 
unified interagency process or organization had created 
significant periods of lackluster effort relative to 
foreign information programs.  The focus of this chapter 
will be on providing an analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
through the framework of U.S. efforts in public diplomacy, 
psychological operations, and public affairs/relations.  
 
B. “SELLING” THE WAR 
Immediately following 9-11, strategic influence 
efforts focused aggressively on the Arab and Muslim worlds.  
Only days after the attack, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
accepted an invitation to appear on Al-Jazeera, the Arab 
satellite news channel.  The purpose of this interview, at 
least in the eyes of the administration, was to explain 
America’s position that Islamic fundamentalists had 
“declared war” on the United States and the U.S. was 
justified in pursuing these organizations wherever they 
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sought refuge.  The Bush administration recognized, 
relatively early on, that U.S. public diplomacy had failed 
to “sell” America to the world, and particularly to the 
Middle East.   
In an effort to re-invigorate the public relations 
aspect of the administrations’ War on Terror, Charlotte 
Beers, an accomplished advertising executive from Wall 
Street, was sworn in as the new Undersecretary of State for 
Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy.  Beers was, for all 
intent and purpose, meant to be to the Bush Administration 
what George Creel was to Woodrow Wilson—a savvy public 
relations expert creative enough to ‘spin’ the war 
whichever way the administration wanted.  Unfortunately for 
the administration, the information environment was 
significantly more complex than it was in 1917. Within two 
months, a House of Representatives subcommittee held a 
hearing on public diplomacy and according to Beers and 
other experts in the field of public diplomacy who 
testified at the hearings, the problem for the U.S. was 
that the rest of the world did not know or understand us or 
the principles on which America was founded.64  Accordingly, 
the main focus for Beers was to begin a comprehensive 
effort to ‘educate’ the rest of the world about America, 
its democratic values, and the concept of liberty.65   
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and National 
Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice followed Secretary 
Powell’s example and also agreed to be interviewed on Al-
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Jazeera.  Concurrently, the State Department began 
compiling evidence that linked Al Qaeda with the 9-11 
attacks.  Their findings were published in a brochure 
called “The Network of Terrorism”.66  A government-sponsored 
website and a series of ads about Muslim life were also 
created to call attention to the “shared values” between 
America and Muslims.  Several new radio stations, in 
various Southwest Asian-dialects, were also created and 
plans to develop an Arabic-language TV network were 
initiated. 
Congress and the Bush administration pushed for an 
intensification of PD efforts to include boosting funding 
for new programs aimed at illuminating American culture and 
policies to the rest of the world.  Subsequently, Congress 
passed the “Freedom Promotion Act of 2002”, which increased 
the budget for public diplomacy by nearly $500 million 
dollars annually.  Furthermore, both the White House and 
the Pentagon67 created offices specifically intended to help 
the U.S. achieve post 9-11 public diplomacy goals. 
With the influx of funding and the new emphasis on 
public diplomacy programs, the USG expected a significant 
increase in Arab and Muslim goodwill towards American 
policies, however it didn’t come to fruition and, in fact, 
had decreased steadily between November 2001 and December 
2002.  This begs the question:  How, despite the resources 
at its disposal, had the U.S. public diplomacy effort 
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resulted in even less support in the Arab world?  Was, or 
is the problem institutional in nature or is it a function 
of conflicting ideologies trying to find common ground that 
doesn’t actually exist given the religious, cultural, and 
political differences?  
The most obvious or simple explanation for U.S. 
failure of public diplomacy relative to the Middle East is 
the fact that President Bush inherited a poor PD 
organizational structure with limited capabilities. 
Convinced that the USIA and other components of strategic 
communications were no longer vital to national security 
following the Cold War, conservatives in Congress forced 
the Clinton administration to sign the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act (1998) that shut down the 
USIA.  Responsibility for conducting public diplomacy was 
handed over to the Department of State under the direction 
of the newly created Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs.  Hundreds of USIA staff personnel were 
either let go or forced to retire leaving the public 
diplomacy corps roughly half the size that it was at prior 
to the end of the Cold War.  With the USIA went several 
American libraries located overseas and foreign 
broadcasting programs were cut by nearly a third.68  
Unfortunately, the State Department was vastly undermanned 
and ill-equipped to take on the burden of coordinating and 
executing the broad strategic communications mission.69  
Pre-Bush  organizational  structure  and  strategy are only  
                     
68 Kaplan, Latif, Whitelaw, and Barnes. “Hearts, Minds and Dollars in an 
Unseen Front in the War on Terrorism, American is Spending Millions…To Change 
the Very Face of Islam.”  U.S. News and World Report, 18 April 2005. 
69 Ibid. 
41
part of the dilemma and merely describes one aspect of the 
inadequate public diplomacy effort in the early period 
following 9-11. 
Following the terrorist attacks, the Bush 
Administration, with a limited strategic influence 
capability, allowed a political and social climate to grow 
where the majority of the Arab world perceived the U.S., 
and the newly declared “War on Terror”, as anti-Islamic in 
both nature and practice.  The whole intent behind public 
diplomacy is to build support for American foreign policy. 
The fact that the U.S. was unable to adequately convey its 
message, in support of strategic objectives, can be linked 
to a lack of American credibility within the Arab world and 
an, initially, insufficient strategic influence doctrine. 
Therefore messages conveyed by America were rarely given 
credence by all but the most progressive of Arabs.70 
Middle Eastern cultures perceive a sharp contradiction 
between what the U.S. says and what it actually does.  
Therefore a credibility issue exists for the USG when 
attempting to influence Arab perceptions.  U.S. credibility 
in the Arab world is affected by the cultural differences 
between the two societies, which are vast. U.S. strategic 
influence, inexplicably, is conducted through the vacuum of 
American cultural influences that clearly don’t translate 
well in the Arab world.  The Muslim perception that the 
U.S. was waging an unjust war for the purpose of 
controlling the 2nd largest oil reserve in the world or 
conducting an all-out assault on the Muslim world itself 
was just that:  a perception, by those who were directly 
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affected by the U.S.’s actions—the average Middle Eastern 
citizen.  Muslim perception is Muslim reality regardless of 
how we, as Westerners or Americans, see the Global War on 
Terror and the subsequent invasion of Iraq.  While it is 
generally accepted that Muslims and other Middle Easterners 
have a favorable view of American’s as individuals, they do 
not care for U.S. policies in the region, particularly with 
respect to our long-standing support of Israel.71   
Initially, and somewhat haphazardly, U.S. strategic 
influence programs focused on getting America’s message out 
both to the Muslim world and the American people. The USG 
attempted to “sell” the GWOT in the same manner in which 
advertising companies sell commercial products: with a glut 
of sound bites and images intended to create warm feelings 
toward a particular product or idea.  This information-
centric approach parallels the ‘over-kill’ methodology that 
fits conveniently within the unique American paradigm where 
information is a form of currency and problems are solved 
or products sold by increasing the amount of information 
supplied to the consumer.  In this case, the ‘product’ was 
the idea that the U.S. Government had reserved the right to 
use any and all means to (1) bring to justice those 
responsible for 9-11, and (2) effect regime change in those 
countries that were suspected of either harboring or having 
relationships with known terrorist organizations.    
In the beginning, the content of the message made 
sense; the U.S. had been attacked, without warning, on its 
own soil, by a hostile foreign entity and it would use any 
and all means to bring those responsible to justice.  The 
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U.S. strategic influence apparatus began ‘selling’ its 
military and diplomatic options to its allies, neutrals, 
and perceived enemies.  The problem was not the message but 
rather how and from what perspective it was crafted.  In 
the Arab world, effective communications provide the basis 
for amicable relationships and trust.  Instead of focusing 
on one-way information exchanges, Arabs tend to rely on 
informal, two-way, association-building methods (such as 
face-to-face contact) in order to connect people within 
loose social or tribal networks.  The distinctive American 
technique of public diplomacy relies heavily on the mass 
media to broadcast its message throughout the world, 
leveraging the advantages of the instant connectivity of 
satellite communications and the Internet.  Arabs, on the 
other hand, have a deeply rooted distrust of their own 
media therefore over-reliance on this form of communication 
to appeal to Middle Easterners may not be the best course 
of action.72 
In retrospect, the USG grossly undervalued the deep-
rooted cultural differences between the West and the 
Islamic world.  Operating within its own cultural vacuum, 
the USG tried to reach Arabs by merely increasing the 
amount of information it supplied explaining to its 
position regarding U.S. policy and impending military 
action.   
 
C. PSYOPS IN SUPPORT OF OIF 
The U.S. and its coalition partners enjoyed a relative 
degree of success conducting psychological operations in 
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support of military operations in Iraq.  The dropping of 
leaflets, radio and TV broadcasts, and news releases (in 
concert with the overall public affairs mission) were 
successful in causing the Iraqi military to, in essence, 
dissolve under constant coalition pressure, both mental and 
physical.  This enabled military forces to conduct an 
attack that may be unprecedented in the history of warfare.  
Reportedly, the PSYOP campaign included over 300 hours of 
TV and radio broadcasts and over 50 million leaflets were 
dropped in key areas of the country during both the build 
up and military phase of the operation.73   
Operational and tactical PSYOPS were effective at 
almost every stage of the operation. However, where the 
U.S. fell short was at the strategic level of psychological 
and political influence.  This was partly due to the 
organizational structure relating to approval authority for 
strategic PSYOP and also a function of poor analysis.  DoD 
and PSYOP planners failed to effectively lay the foundation 
for both ending the conflict phase and the post-combat 
rebuilding stage within Iraq.  Indirectly, the USG’s 
failure to adequately or accurately measure Iraqi (and 
Arabs in general) attitudes toward the United States and 
its policies created an environment within the country 
where few U.S.-generated messages would have validity.  
Specifically, USG officials underestimated the impact of 
U.N. sanctions during the period following Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm in 1991, failure of the U.S. to support the 
anti-Ba’ath uprising immediately after the first Gulf War, 
and, perhaps more importantly, America’s continued support, 
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politically and economically, of Israel.  No public 
relations effort or information operation can make up for 
bad policy or policies that appear to be anti-Muslim in 
intent and practice.  The U.S., in its public diplomacy 
campaign and PSYOP effort, failed to convince the average 
Iraqi citizen that America was not invading Iraq for the 
purpose of controlling its oil or that its intention was to 
be an occupying force.74  The insurgency that followed the 
official end of combat operations, arguably, can be 
attributed to these factors.  Had the USG recognized just 
how deep anti-American feelings ran in the region, post-
combat phase losses might not have reached the level that 
they have. 
Organizationally speaking, the top down planning and 
approval authority that exists within DoD and the Pentagon 
has been a hindrance to effective PSYOPS in Iraq and has 
caused U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) planners to “miss 
the boat” often due to poor use of assets and an even worse 
sense of timing.  Pentagon officials failure to plan for 
Phase IV operations along with an inability to capitalize 
on PSYOP targets of opportunity within the area of 
responsibility (AOR) has, perhaps, hindered efforts to 
subdue the insurgency, restore civil order, and support 
civil-military operations (CMO) within Iraq.75  To which 
degree either failure has contributed to the insurgency is 
debatable and fodder for another study however conflict 
resolution depends on convincing not just Iraqi citizens 
but Arabs in general that the U.S. has no intention of 
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long-term occupation of Iraq and that it has viable nation-
building plans in place to create a better, more prosperous 
nation. 
 
D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN OIF 
One cannot wage war under present conditions 
without the support of public opinion, which is 
tremendously molded by the press and other forms 
of propaganda. 
General Douglas MacArthur, US Army 
In On War, noted military theorist Carl von 
Clausewitz, identified three pivotal entities that effect a 
nation’s ability to conduct war: the government, the 
military, and the people.  As the United States witnessed 
in the Vietnam Conflict, dissension within the public 
domain creates a significantly unstable political and 
social environment thus affecting the decisions of the 
political leaders regarding the prosecution of the war.  In 
order to declare and wage war, the public must be convinced 
that those actions are, indeed, necessary and more 
importantly, in their own interest. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration 
and the Pentagon began to develop a calculated public 
affairs campaign to raise support for a potential invasion 
of Iraq.  Government domestic communications were also 
aided by the heightened emotions and sense of insecurity 
following the attack.  It is no secret that the American 
center of gravity has always been public opinion therefore 
insuring domestic support is vital to maintain the level of 
support needed to wage war.  In the case of going to war in 
Iraq, the American public was told repeatedly that military 
force may be necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power 
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because Iraq posed an imminent threat to U.S. national 
security.  By defining the national interests that were at 
stake for America and its citizens, the White House set out 
to make the war with Iraq the most important topic on the 
minds of the American public before the conflict. In order 
to make this issue one of critical immediacy, they first 
relied on targeting the emotions of their audience.  
With 11 September 2001 still in everyone’s minds, the 
USG’s public relations campaign strove to not only make the 
public recall the feelings they experienced during that 
horrific event, but to strengthen those feelings in the 
hopes of hitting a nerve and eliciting an immediate 
emotional response in order to create support for military 
operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. An 
example of which comes from President Bush’s State of the 
Union Address given on January 29th, 2002: 
…For many Americans, these four months have 
brought sorrow, and pain that will never 
completely go away.  Every day a retired 
firefighter returns to Ground Zero, to feel 
closer to his two sons who died there.  At a 
memorial in New York, a little boy left his 
football with a note for his lost father:  Dear 
Daddy, please take this to heaven.  I don't want 
to play football until I can play with you again 
some day…76  
Another key aspect of that address, now more 
familiarly known as the “Axis of Evil Speech”, was the 
administration’s laying the groundwork, publicly, for the 
invasion  of  Iraq  based on their alleged ties to Al Qaeda  
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and other terrorist organizations combined with the Bush 
administrations belief that Iraq had not dismantled their 
WMD programs after 1998: 
…Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward 
America and to support terror.  The Iraqi regime 
has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, 
and nuclear weapons for over a decade.  This is a 
regime that has already used poison gas to murder 
thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the 
bodies of mothers huddled over their dead 
children.  This is a regime that agreed to 
international inspections -- then kicked out the 
inspectors [1998]. This is a regime that has 
something to hide from the civilized world…States 
like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger. They could provide these arms to 
terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt 
to blackmail the United States.  In any of these 
cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic...77  
Following the invasion of Iraq and subsequent capture 
of Baghdad, it became apparent that Iraq’s WMD programs had 
all but ended in the mid to late-1990’s creating an 
undercurrent of distrust among many American citizens and 
undermining USG credibility both at home and abroad.  
Subsequently, the public relations experts were able to 
exploit the visible proof of human rights violations found 
by occupying U.S. military forces gave the administration 
something else to focus on further rallying domestic 
support for the military action in Iraq.  This was enabled 
by, perhaps, the single most influential public affairs 
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effort undertaken during this or, perhaps, any other war:  
the embedding of reporters with military units in Iraq.   
The brain-child of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs, Torie Clarke, the embed program gave the 
Pentagon the opportunity to foster a bond between civilian 
reporters and troops in the field, a relationship which the 
USG gambled would create a lasting and harmonious 
relationship.  In the embed program, journalists would live 
with a military unit experiencing everything that the 
average soldier did on a daily basis; which included fire 
fights, attacks from improvised explosive devices (IED), 
and the everyday jubilation and sorrow that is a 
fundamental aspect of combat.  Not only did this allow the 
media access to breaking news but it also gave the 
appearance that it was, in fact, unbiased and unvarnished.  
Private media corporations such as CNN, Fox News, and the 
‘big three’ (CBS, NBC, and ABC) jumped at this opportunity 
and sent journalists by the dozen to a one-week crash 
course on military equipment and operations sponsored and 
instructed by military personnel. The Pentagon’s 
willingness to allow unimpeded access to journalists 
appeared, on the surface, to be a colossal compromise on 
the part of the military establishment.  However, what the 
media members failed to appreciate or account for was the 
uncommon bond that develops between those in combat 
therefore journalists became, in a sense, a part of the 
unit, biased by their shared hardships in a uncompromising 
and harsh environment.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
Pentagon carefully considered the pros and cons of allowing 
this level of media access and determined the benefits 
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outweighed the potential for a public relations disaster.  
As it was, the Pentagon successfully leveraged the media as  
a strategic enabler in support of its overall IO campaign.78   
Embedded media also played a significant role in 
reducing the ability of the Iraqis to conduct a significant 
propaganda campaign of their own.  Hussein’s brash claims 
of U.S. troops being ‘slaughtered’ on the battlefields by 
elite Republican Guard troops were quickly dispelled when 
American network news stations showed members of the U.S. 
Army’s 3rd Infantry Division relaxing in Saddam Hussein’s 
Presidential Palace in downtown Baghdad. Up-to-the-minute 
reporting by embedded journalists in the field with U.S. 
troops highlighted the frenzied nature of the battlefield 
and the Ba’ath regimes blatant disregard for the laws of 
land warfare and the Geneva Convention.  Embedded media 
members reported on the insurgents’ tactics; using women 
and children as human shields while engaging U.S. troops; 
and engaging U.S. and Coalition forces from hospitals, 
mosques, and schools.  The military-media relationship, 
though delicate and fraught with distrust, is critical to 
U.S. global influence and information strategy.  In the 
case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the USG was able to use 
embedded media to shape the information environment in 
perhaps the most important arena: American public opinion, 
in a manner favorable to U.S. political and military 
objectives in Iraq.79   
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Unfortunately, that support hasn’t continued in what 
has now become known as Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) 
where U.S. and Coalition forces have faced a difficult and 
bloody insurgency.  Despite the fact that the U.S.-led 
coalition has made significant improvements in Iraqi 
quality of life, introduced a democratically elected 
government, and killed or captured a majority of former 
Ba’ath officials, media support during the post-invasion 
period appears to have substantially lessened.  Reporting 
has often focused on negative topics such as the death of 
civilians, human rights violations by U.S. service-members 
at Abu Ghraib prison, and the rising death toll of U.S. 
forces.  Are these newsworthy events?  Yes, however they 
are not indicative or reflective of the situation as a 
whole in Iraq.   
Where did the USG go wrong in maintaining media 
support for military operations following the end of 
“official” combat operations?  Political leaders must 
inform the public about foreign policy goals; the military 
must persuade the public that it can accomplish those goals 
at a tolerable cost.  The government achieves communication 
objectives by providing information to the media who then 
reports it through various news mediums. Media reports of 
victory and progress serve to reinforce and broaden public 
support for the policies and actions that the government 
takes on their behalf. The media also provides access to 
the military and conveys the complexity of its mission to 
the general public. In essence, the media provides a forum 
for  the  military  to  enlighten  the public as to what it  
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does. The press has its own incentives to report on 
military affairs, and it needs the military’s cooperation 
to do so.80   
During OIF I, an overwhelming majority of media 
reports were positive as there was plenty of “good news” to 
report.  The media reported the positive stories that the 
USG provided them and, again, each helped the other to 
achieve their respective goals.  As the stability and 
security operations began in Iraq and the insurgency began 
to intensify, dissension in various levels of government 
occurred concerning a range of political aspects of the 
operation in Iraq.  News stories began to reflect the tone 
or overall negativity towards certain events in Iraq.  
Writing after the abrupt withdrawal of Coalition forces 
from Fallujah [April 2004], Ralph Peters offered his 
assessment of the power of the media in determining 
military outcomes:  
The [US] Marines in Fallujah weren’t beaten by 
the terrorists and insurgents, who were being 
eliminated effectively and accurately. They were 
beaten by al-Jazeera…The media [are] often 
referred to off-handedly as a strategic factor. 
But we still don’t fully appreciate [their] fatal 
power…In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of 
hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape 
us—despite promising that we would bring them to 
justice. We stopped because we were worried about 
what already hostile populations might think of 
us. The global media disrupted the US and 
Coalition chains of command…We could have won 
militarily.  Instead,  we surrendered politically  
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and called it a success. Our enemies won the 
information war. We literally didn’t know what 
hit us.81 
The protracted insurgency has presented new challenges 
for the USG in seeking to shape the media’s portrayal of 
conditions on the battlefield. The experience of U.S. 
Marines in the first battle of Fallujah and, then again, in 
An Najaf82 typifies the problem that the USG has had in 
managing the media in OIF II. Moves to decisively engage 
and defeat insurgent groups were rapidly thwarted by media 
reporting of hardship and suffering in the towns and of 
considerable damage to the urban infrastructure. Political 
pressure to limit the assault quickly followed, and the 
Marines subsequently withdrew.  In both examples, the 
general perception is one of strategic defeat for US 
forces, whatever the tactical success achieved by U.S. 
forces.  Managing the media in this type of politically 
charged environment presents a different challenge for the 
USG altogether given the role the media can play in 
influencing the domestic and international portrayal of 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout the 20th Century, the USG’s strategic 
information programs have had periods of great success 
followed by drastic reorganizations and periods of 
ineffectiveness.  Post-war troop reductions and the 
perception that peacetime strategic information 
requirements are not as essential as they are in wartime 
further hampered the continued growth of influence 
capabilities.  It is evident that the U.S. has a desperate 
need for an integrated information strategy consistent with 
both foreign and domestic policies.  The development of and 
publishing of a National Information Strategy (NIS) would 
establish concrete objectives and give unifying guidance to 
all elements of U.S. information programs. Just as the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military 
Strategy (NMS) unify the efforts of all agencies concerned 
with national security and the projection and application 
of military power, a National Information Strategy (NIS) 
would unify the efforts of all government agencies involved 
in strategic communications and information operations.  An 
NIS would provide appropriate guidance on information 
themes and strategies aiding planners in the development of 
coherent information campaigns in order to support U.S. 
policy objectives.  In a historical sense, it appears that 
the Reagan Administration created a model for how U.S. 
strategic influence policy and organization should be 
conducted.  Looking at it strictly based on results, no 
other administration since Theodore Roosevelt accomplished 
as much in the arena of strategic influence as the Reagan 
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administration.  Serving as President during, arguably, the 
most critical period of the Cold War, Reagan elevated 
strategic information programs to where they became a 
fundamental instrument of U.S. national security policy.  
No other administration before or since has been able to 
control and manipulate the information environment as well.  
The Bush Administration would be well served to elevate, 
through a Presidential directive, all elements of strategic 
communications to include public diplomacy, public affairs, 
and military IO, to a position of prominence within the 
overall National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United 
States.  Presidential or executive-level advocacy provides 
the necessary impetus to improve the overall organization, 
coordination, conduct of, and funding for strategic 
influence programs.   
Creation of a strategic information organizational 
structure within the National Security Council should be 
formally established and given appropriate authorities to 
apportion responsibilities and prioritization of efforts 
within the applicable agencies that are involved in 
strategic communication programs.  Just as NSDD 77 did 
under President Reagan, the current administration would be 
prudent to create a Special Planning Group or committee for 
strategic influence and information operations which would 
provide the necessary oversight and coordination of all 
elements of U.S. information programs to include military 
information operations conducted in support of theater 
objectives.  Like all government agencies and programs, 
tasking authority and advocacy are inherently crucial 
elements to an organizations overall functionality.  It is 
crucial that this organization be provided the appropriate 
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executive-level authorities to plan, advise, coordinate, or 
execute all elements of strategic communications across the 
entire spectrum from public diplomacy to military 
information operations and all other supporting or related 
capabilities and activities.  
Government communication programs necessitate 
employing true regional experts versed in language, social 
customs, history, political systems, and religion.  These 
experts should encompass the bulk of the personnel who 
study, plan for, and execute information programs in 
support of national security policy and objectives.  
Cultural understanding is fundamental for environmental 
context and important to the development of an information 
strategy relative to a particular region.  Understanding 
the history of a region or specific country will help focus 
the influence strategy.  Developers of information 
strategies need to determine whose attitudes and behaviors 
we are trying to change and focus on those who are most apt 
to be influenced in a manner that support U.S. policy 
objectives.   
 
B. CONCLUSION 
Rapid advances in technology have produced an 
exceptionally complex information environment.  Global 
communications have served to expand the collective 
cognizance of major events, issues, and concerns.  Global 
inter-connectivity has ignited passions, sparked 
perspectives, and compelled nations, organizations, and 
institutions worldwide to think and act in accordance with 
the perceptions and biases of those with whom they 
interact.  Advances in information capabilities have 
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complicated the United States’ capacity to manipulate the 
information environment in its favor.  That being said, the 
U.S. has the potential to exert an unparalleled amount of 
influence on the rest of the world through its all-
encompassing media and information capabilities but only if 
the USG recognizes the importance of strategic information 
programs and their effects on the rest of the world.  
Roughly a dozen years following the end of the Cold 
War, the United States again finds itself in a battle for 
“hearts and minds.”  The ongoing counter-insurgency in 
Iraq, like the Cold War and the war in Vietnam, will 
require an ambitious influence strategy and effort to 
contain, and eventually eradicate, the hatred and distrust 
for the United States and its policies in the region.  The 
U.S. Government has a desperate need to engage in an 
integrated strategic influence campaign in order to lessen 
the antagonistic mind-set and actions against the United 
States.  However, information strategies and programs, by 
themselves, won’t be enough to win over the Muslim world as 
the disdain and distrust runs too deep.  The USG must 
support its information programs with other, more tangible 
efforts designed to bridge the gap between the U.S. and 
Islam.  Just as bullets and bombs are not likely to win 
wars by themselves, information programs alone will not win 
the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. 
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